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3ABSTRACT
Drawing a framework from stakeholder theory, this study uses 1994 data drawn
from 100 United Kingdom listed companies to test empirically whether the level of
discretionary donations made by companies to charitable, social and political causes
is related to four company-specific factors, namely leverage, company size,
profitability and ownership structure. Consistent with our hypotheses, the results
indicate that the decision to contribute funds to charities and other bodies is
positively related to company size and profitability and negatively related to
leverage.  However, the study provides no support for the view that there is a link
between discretionary donations and a company’s ownership structure.
4A STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE DONATIONS:
UNITED KINGDOM EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
The organisation and management literatures (e.g. Anderson, 1986; Mescon and
Tilson, 1987; Haley, 1991; Moore, 1995) have long recognised that social
responsibility  beyond the pursuit of profit and the maximisation of shareholders’
interests  is an important corporate duty.1 Social responsibility frequently involves
companies in using discretionary funds to benefit charitable causes, promote
community projects and support political parties (Cowton, 1986, 1987; McGuire,
Sundren and Schneeweis, 1988; Navarro, 1988; Haley, 1991; Hart, 1993). Hart (1993,
p. 16) considers that philanthropic behaviour by companies is often controversial
because “ . . . it is not clear that [donations] . . . are made with the consent of the
firm’s owners, or whether they are a form of self-aggrandizing or self-promoting
behaviour by management . . . “. Navarro (1988, p. 66) expresses a similar view and
contends that companies may give to charities and other groups such as political
parties “. . . for reasons other than profit maximization, such as to satisfy the goals of
shirking managers rather than those of shareholders . . .”. Cowton (1987, p. 553)
adds that “. . . the growth of the debate on the social responsibilities of business and
discussions of the appropriate size and role of government-funded welfare has
heightened the significance of, and interest in, companies’ support of charitable
activity”. Therefore, what motivates managers in companies to make discretionary
donations is an empirical question of some  importance. Drawing a framework from
stakeholder theory, this study uses 1994 data drawn from 100 United Kingdom (UK)
listed companies to test empirically whether the level of corporate donations is
related to company-specific characteristics, namely leverage, firm size, profitability
and ownership structure.
Four motives underpin this study. First, linkages between the level of donations and
company-specific characteristics such as leverage and firm size, could help
stakeholders like shareholders, creditors and customers, to make better informed
business decisions. For example, companies which make substantial contributions to
charities and other social causes are likely to promote a socially responsible public
5image which could extend to other aspects of business practice, such as the
maintenance of high standards of product quality and customer care. Second, the
study could have important policy implications. For instance, a high level of
corporate donations to social causes could signal to government bodies that
managers are sincere in the dealings with their stakeholders, thus obviating the
need for costly regulations (e.g. with regard to customer care) to be imposed. Third,
our results could contribute insights into the strategic management function of
companies. For example, the decision to contribute funds to charities and
community projects could indicate that managers are seeking to improve customer
and/or investor goodwill as part of a longer-term corporate strategy. The
development of goodwill amongst various stakeholders could enable companies to
broaden their strategic options in the future. Fourth, we believe that empirical
evidence obtained in this study could provide a yardstick against which the results
of future research into the motives for corporate donations in both the UK and
elsewhere can be evaluated.
Our results indicate that the corporate decision to contribute discretionary funds to
charities and other bodies is positively related to company size and profitability and
negatively related to leverage. However, we find no support for the view that there
is a link between discretionary donations and a company’s ownership structure.
Finally, we find no statistically significant industry effects, and we find no
significant link between discretionary donations and the nationality of the
companies in the sample.
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. The next section provides
background information on the nature and scale of corporate donations in the UK,
while the third section introduces stakeholder theory and puts forward four
hypotheses to facilitate empirical testing. The research design, including the sources
of data, the statistical model and the variables used are then described. The fifth
section discusses the empirical results and conclusions are made in the final part of
the paper.
6DISCRETIONARY DONATIONS BY THE UK CORPORATE SECTOR
Section 234 (3) and Schedule 7 (paragraphs. 3 and 4) of the UK’s Companies Act 1985
require companies to disclose contributions of over £200 to charities and political
bodies in the directors’ report which accompanies the published annual accounts.
Under the 1985 Act, recipients of political donations must be disclosed and the sum
stated, but no such disclosures are required with regard to charitable donations or
contributions to other social causes. The Finance Act 1986 liberalised the taxation
rules concerning discretionary corporate donations allowing qualifying payments to
be treated as an allowable charge on income for the purposes of tax relief (Cowton,
1987). Cowton (1989) further contends that the statutory obligation for UK-based
companies to report discretionary donations developed out of a political concern
that such disclosure was not only in the general public interest, but also information
which shareholders and prospective investors would find useful in making
economic judgements.
In the financial year 1992-1993, the value of charitable donations made by UK listed
companies amounted to approximately £151 million, with declared community
sponsorships amounting to an additional £248 million (Casson, 1993). In aggregate,
this figure represents about £399 million or 0.74 per cent of annual pre-taxable
profits of UK listed companies. As a proportion of annual pre-taxable profits, it
would appear that the current rate of charitable and community contributions made
by UK companies has grown steadily over the last twenty years or so (e.g. see
Cowton 1987) and their relative contribution rate is approaching that of companies
operating in other developed economies such as the United States (US) (Anderson,
1986)2. Therefore, as Moore (1995, p. 171) observes, UK companies “ . . . are making
an important contribution to the well-being of communities throughout the country .
. .  and that this is now a normal and expected part of business activity ”.
From a survey of 79 of the largest Times 1000 UK companies carried out in 1985,
Cowton (1986, 1987) noted that industrial and financial institutions were split evenly
among the 10 biggest sponsors of charitable and community projects corporate
donations, although overall industrial concerns contributed nearly 80 per cent of
total donations (1985 = £119 million). The main reason for making charitable
donations cited by 48 (61 per cent) of the executives surveyed was to promote a
7more prominent socially responsible public image for the company. However, the
survey results indicated that executives rarely monitored the use and effectiveness
to which their contributions were put.
In contrast to charitable contributions, detailed information regarding donations
made by UK companies to political parties are difficult to come by (Pinto-
Duschinsky, 1985; Fisher, 1994). However, Fisher (1994) reports that for 1992-93, 242
of the top 4,000 UK companies (i.e. approximately 6 per cent of the total) gave £4.3
million to political parties, of which approximately 95 per cent went to the
Conservative Party. Surprisingly, little research has documented or analysed the
motives for political donations, though intuitively, several economic and socio-
political explanations could help to explain such behaviour. For example, companies
may make political donations as part of the commercial strategy of avoiding the
increased regulatory costs of an interventionist party. Alternatively, companies may
wish to promote a more ‘socially acceptable’ image by contributing to the costs of
democracy. The degree to which stakeholder theory contributes insights into the
motives for discretionary corporate donations is examined below.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Stakeholder theory postulates that various constituencies - including shareholders,
creditors, managers, employees, customers, government and the general public -
have legitimate claims on the modern corporation (Freeman, 1984). Legitimacy is
established either through explicit contractual obligations (e.g. remuneration
packages) or by unwritten implicit arrangements (e.g. a fiduciary duty to treat the
work-force fairly). The major strategic objective of corporate management is thus to
balance the conflicting claims (both explicit and implicit) of the various stakeholders
(Roberts, 1992). In this regard, Hill and Jones (1992) consider stakeholder theory to
be a generalised form of agency theory - a mode of analysis which has emerged as
the dominant paradigm in the financial economics literature.
Proponents of stakeholder theory (e.g. Ullmann, 1985; Cornell and Shapiro, 1987;
Hill and Jones, 1992; Roberts, 1992) contend that stakeholder theory provides a
viable framework within which to examine management strategy, including the
motives for socially responsible activities. For example, stakeholder theory explicitly
8acknowledges that the government and general public contribute resources and
facilities (e.g. government inducements, infrastructure, educated workforce and so
on) so that companies can operate effectively and that in return external
stakeholders, at least implicitly, expect some payback in the form of financial
support for social causes. As a result, we consider that stakeholder theory has
intuitive appeal in providing insights into why companies might make discretionary
payments to support charitable and other social activities. In the remainder of this
section we therefore put forward four testable hypotheses derived from stakeholder
theory regarding the linkages between the level of donations and the characteristics
of UK listed companies.
Leverage
In the agency theory literature, high corporate leverage is frequently associated with
increased contracting costs. For example, debt contracts could impose liquidity tests,
unscheduled audits, investment restrictions and sinking-fund requirements, in
addition to establishing the pre-emptive claims of debtholders in the event of
bankruptcy (Booth, 1992). As mentioned earlier, stakeholder theory holds that
companies must not only satisfy the explicit contractual rights of parties such as
debtholders to receive a satisfactory return on their capital, but also fulfill the
implicit claims of other constituencies such as the government and local community
to avoid financial risks (e.g. bankruptcy). For instance, Cornell and Shapiro (1987)
argue that it is in the interest of implicit claimants to minimise the risk of corporate
financial distress because they are likely to incur costs (e.g. with respect to job losses)
in the event of bankruptcy. McGuire et al. (1988, p. 856) also contend that “ . . . to the
degree that a firm has high social responsibility . . . it may also have a low
percentage of total debt to total assets . . .”. In other words, a low level of corporate
leverage (hence low contracting costs) could ensure that owners and their managers
continue to satisfy the implicit claims of external constituencies by means of
charitable and other contributions.  Barton, Hill and Sundaram (1989) also furnish
empirical evidence from US companies to suggest that cross-sectional variations in
corporate social responsibility can be explained by differences in capital structure.
Therefore, our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, lowly leveraged companies will make larger
donations than highly leveraged companies.
9Company Size
Ball and Foster (1982) maintain that company size is a comprehensive variable
which can proxy for several corporate characteristics, including economies of scale
in production and competitive advantage. Nonetheless, Roberts (1992) reports that
company size is an important correlate of political exposure and as a result, it is
likely to reflect the level of corporate social responsibility activity. He reasons that
corporate size would be positively related to socially responsible activities because
large companies are more likely than small companies to be subject to scrutiny from
the general public and government bodies. Cowen, Ferreri and Parker (1987) share
this view when they argue that compared with small companies, larger companies
are likely to have more stakeholders interested in corporate social activities. Watts
and Zimmerman (1978) and Belkaoui and Karpik (1988), among others, also argue
that large companies are more likely than small companies to be politically visible.
As a result, large companies could increase discretionary donations to charities, the
local community and other bodies, in order to mitigate the risk that government
agencies might impose additional costs (e.g., higher taxation and regulatory
compliance costs) on them if they do not act in a socially responsible manner.
Therefore, the second hypothesis is:
 Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, large companies will make larger donations than
small companies.
Profitability
Ullmann (1985), McGuire et al. (1988), and Roberts (1992), among others, argue that
financial performance could influence corporate social behaviour. For example,
McGuire et al. (1988, p. 857) contend that contributions to charities and other causes
“ . . . may be especially sensitive to the existence of slack resources . . . [and that] less
profitable firms may be less willing to undertake socially responsible actions.” In a
similar vein, Roberts (1992, p. 599) states that “ . . . economic performance directly
affects the financial capability to institute social responsibility programs. Therefore, .
. . the better the economic performance of a company, the greater its social
responsibility activity . . .”.  The positive linkage between profitability and corporate
social responsibility has also been acknowledged by Alexander and Buchholz (1978,
p. 479) when they state that “ . . . socially aware and concerned management will
also possess the requisite skills to run a superior company in the traditional sense of
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financial performance, thus making its firm an attractive investment . . .”. Therefore,
it seems reasonable to conclude that profitable companies are likely to have the
discretionary funds to commit to charitable and other programmes whereas
companies with poor financial performance are likely to restrict managerial
discretion over social responsibility expenditures. Indeed, Cochran and Wood (1984)
provide empirical evidence from the US corporate sector supporting the notion of a
direct relationship between the level of company donations and profitability.
Consequently, our third hypothesis is:
 Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, profitable companies will make larger donations
than less profitable companies.
Ownership Structure
In companies with widely dispersed shareholdings, managers are likely to have
considerable discretion over operational decisions compared with their counterparts
in entities with a more concentrated ownership structure (Grossman and Hart,
1980). Therefore, other things being equal, the less concentrated the ownership
structure of companies the more discretion managers are likely to have to make
donations. Haley (1991) suggests that greater discretion to make charitable and other
donations could help managers to increase their own prestige in the local
community and thereby enhance the value of their reputational capital in the
internal and external labour markets. However, Navarro (1988) contends that
socially responsible managerial behaviour could be made at the expense of
maximising shareholders’ wealth. In contrast, managers in companies with
concentrated ownership would be subject to close monitoring and control by
shareholders and thus be less likely to make discretionary donations without their
knowledge and consent. Hart (1993) also considers that in closely-held companies
managers who do not act in accordance with shareholders’ interests with regard to
the making of discretionary payments could also be subject to ex-post litigation.
Conversely, Ullmann (1985) argues that dispersed corporate ownership heightens
the pressure for managers to engage in socially responsible activities such as making
charitable donations for other reasons. For example, Ullmann(1985) suggests that the
more diffuse the ownership structure of companies, the  greater is the possibility
that there will be shareholders (e.g. ethical investors, religious and civic pension
funds) who could have an interest in promoting a socially responsible corporate
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image. Hart (1993) also argues that as corporate donations to charities and other
groups benefit all shareholders, it is likely to be more cost-effective to give to social
projects as a company expense rather than rely on individual shareholders to
contribute out of their dividends. This is because some shareholders may attempt to
free-ride on the social contributions made by others. As a result, our fourth
hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, companies with widely-held shareholdings are likely
to make larger donations than companies with a more closely-held ownership
structure.
RESEARCH DESIGN
To test the four hypotheses, a discretionary donations equation was estimated using
measures of leverage, company size, profitability and ownership structure as
independent variables. Cross-sectional data were obtained from the published
annual reports of a random sample of 100 UK listed companies for the year-ended
1994. This sample represented approximately 5 per cent of total companies quoted
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) at that time. The sample also represented the
latest and most complete source of data available at the time the study was carried
out in 1996.3
The dependent variable (DON), representing the level of corporate discretionary
donations, is the aggregate of charitable, community and political contributions
made by each company during the year (£m).
The independent variables are defined as follows:
Leverage   Leverage is defined as the ratio of total long-term debt at book value plus
prior charge capital (e.g. preference shares) over the total market value of assets
reported at year-end.
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Company Size   Company size is measured as the total market value of assets held at
year-end (£m).
Profitability   Profitability (or financial performance) is measured as the ratio of net
profit before interest and taxation to turnover at year-end.
Ownership Structure   Ownership structure is measured as the proportion of the total
number of shares issued held by the top three shareholders.4
The model to be estimated can be expressed as follows:
lnDON    =    b0   +   b1 lnLEV  +   b2 lnSIZE   +   b3 lnPROF   +   b4 lnOWN   +   e
where DON is the level of discretionary donations, LEV is leverage, SIZE is
company size, PROF is profitability, OWN is ownership structure and e is the
disturbance term assumed to have a zero mean and constant variance. All the
variables included in the function are expressed in natural logarithms (ln): this
means that partial derivatives can be interpreted as elasticities and it may help to
eliminate heteroscedsticity in the disturbances.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients
The means and standard deviations of the variables included in the study (DON,
LEV, SIZE, PROF and OWN) are shown in Table 1 for the 100 firms in the
sample, classified into four major industrial groups - construction,
services/utilities, manufacturing/engineering and others. Table 1 also shows a
Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for the natural logarithms of these
variables (as included in the regression equation) and variance-inflation factors
for the independent variables in the model to test for multicollinearity. Table 1
indicates that the average level of discretionary donations is about £950,000 for
all the companies in the sample, but this average varies from £140,000 for
companies in the construction industry to ten times that figure for companies in
the services/utililities and ‘other’ industry groups. The manufacturing and
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engineering companies in the sample contributed average discretionary
donations of just over £0.5 million in 1994. The companies in the sample also
differ significantly in size across industry groups: the largest companies are in
the services/utilities industry group with average assets of over £9.8 billion,
while the smallest companies in the sample are in the construction industry
where average company assets amount to just over £735 million. It is clear from
the standard deviations that there is a good deal of variation in all variables
across the sample.
Turning to the correlation coefficients of the logarithms of the variables, we see
that, as expected, lnDON is positively and significantly correlated with lnSIZE
and lnPROF. There is also evidence of significant negative correlation between
lnDON and lnOWN (contrary to our expectations) and of positive correlation
between lnDON and lnLEV (also contrary to our expectations), but in this case
the correlation coefficient is not statistically significant at the five per cent level.
The correlation coefficients between pairs of independent variables presented in
Table 1 are quite low (all are less than 0.44) and so do not suggest any problems
associated with multicollinearity. However, as collinearity can exist between
more than two independent variables, variance-inflation factors were computed
in the manner recommended by Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980).5  The results are
summarised in the final part of Table 1. Since all of the calculated variance-
inflation factors are less than 2, interaction between the independent variables
does not appear to be problematic.
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Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, Pearson Correlation Coefficients and
Variance-Inflation Factors
This table shows the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the
variables used in the study, classified into four industry groups. A Pearson
correlation matrix for all the variables in the regression model is also
shown, together with variance-inflation factors to test for multicollinearity.
Means and Standard Deviations
Industry group DON     LEV      SIZE     PROF    OWN  Sample size
  (£m)                     (£b)
1. Construction 0.14 0.29 0.74 0.06 0.25     8
(0.22) (0.22) (1.13) (0.06) (0.26)
2. Services/Utilities 1.40 0.18 9.81 0.16 0.23   30
(3.30) (0.19) (22.8) (0.17) (0.19)
3. Manufacturing/ 0.53  0.17 2.67 0.09 0.22   42
Engineering (1.31) (0.17) (6.95) (0.09) (0.15)
4. Other 1.51 0.26 3.41 0.14 0.26   20
(4.44)     (0.19)    (7.00)     (0.13)    (0.23)
All industries 0.95 0.20 4.81 0.12 0.23 100
(2.82)     (0.19)    (13.9)    (0.13)    (0.19)
Correlation Coefficient Matrix
lnLEV      lnSIZE     lnPROF     lnOWN
lnDON 0.10 0.81* 0.36* -0.36*
lnLEV 0.23* 0.04 -0.24*
lnSIZE 0.28*        -0.43*
lnPROF 0.16
Variance-Inflation Factors: lnLEV  1.09 lnSIZE  1.35 lnPROF  1.09   lnOWN  1.27
15
Regression Results
The log-linear discretionary donations equation was estimated by ordinary least
squares (OLS) and a number of additional diagnostic tests were performed. The
parameter estimates and test statistics which resulted from the estimation are
summarised in Table 2. The estimate of the coefficient of lnOWN had an expected
negative sign, but was found to be insignificantly different from zero (t = -0.28).
It was, therefore, omitted from the equation. It exclusion from the model had
only a marginal effect on the magnitude and significance of the other estimates.
All of the remaining parameter estimates have expected signs and are
statistically significant at the five per cent level in one-tailed tests. The F-statistic
of 67.74 enables us to reject the hypothesis that b1 = b2 = b3 = 0, and the adjusted
R-squared value of 0.67 indicates a reasonably good fit, particularly in a model
using cross-section data.
Hypothesis Tests
We now consider the implications of the regression results for the four hypotheses
proposed above.
Hypothesis 1:   The estimate of the lnLEV coefficient (b1) is negative, as expected, and
is just statistically significant at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed test. This supports
the view, therefore, that lowly leveraged companies make larger discretionary
donations than more highly leveraged companies as the low contracting costs
associated with low leverage enable companies to satisfy the implicit claims of
external contituencies (such as the government and local communities). The
parameter estimate of -0.21, which can be interpreted as the elasticity of
discretionary donations with respect to leverage, suggests that, ceteris paribus, a 10
per cent increase in a company’s leverage will lead on average to a 2.1 per cent
increase in its discretionary donations. Thus, the regression results provide clear
support for Hypothesis 1 and help to confirm the findings of researchers such as
Barton et al (1988) who argue that corporate social responsibility is linked to a
company’s capital structure.
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Table 2
Parameter Estimates and Test Statistics
This table shows the OLS parameter estimates for the discretionary
donations equation using data from a sample of 100 UK listed companies
in 1994. A selection of diagnostic test statistics is also shown.
Parameter1 Estimate2 t-value
         b0 -8.95
*  11.25
     b1             -0.21
* -1.66
     b2  1.00
*            12.73
     b3  0.28
*  2.38
     b4                 -         -
Test Statistics
Mean of the dependent variable -2.65
Standard deviation of dependent variable  2.63
Standard error of the regression  1.51
F Statistic            67.74
White test3 c2  =     3.28
Breusch-Pagan test4 c2  =     2.16
Adjusted R-squared   0.67
Notes
1. b1 is the coefficient of lnLEV;  b2 is the coefficient of lnSIZE;  b3  is the 
coefficient of lnPROF;  b4 is the coefficient of lnOWN.
2. * = significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level or better (one-tailed 
tests).
3. For the White test, the critical value of c2 at the five per cent level of 
significance is 31.4. The null hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be 
rejected.
4. For the Breusch-Pagan test, the critical value of c2 at the five per cent 
level is 11.1. The null hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected.
17
The White and Breusch-Pagan test statistics do not allow us to reject the hypothesis
of homoscedasticity at the five per cent level of significance.
Hypothesis 2: Statistically, the estimate of the coefficient of lnSIZE (b2) is significantly
greater than zero at the 0.001 level or better. The estimate (equal to 1.0), which can
be interpreted as the elasticity of discretionary donations with respect to a
company’s asset size, suggests that, ceteris paribus, any given percentage increase in
company size will lead on average to an equal percentage increase in discretionary
donations. Thus, we have found clear support for Hypothesis 2 (derived from the
theoretical work of Roberts, 1992, and Cowen et al, 1987), according to which larger
companies engage in more socially responsible activities than smaller companies.
Interestingly, a parameter estimate of 1.0 implies that the average value of
discretionary donations per pound of assets is approximately the same for all sizes of
companies.
Hypothesis 3:  Statistically, the estimate of the coefficient of lnPROF (b3) is
significantly greater than zero at the 0.01 level or better in a one-tailed test. This
finding supports the view that more profitable companies are more likely (and more
able) to contribute discretionary donations than less profitable companies. The
parameter estimate of 0.28 suggests that, ceteris paribus, a 10 per cent increase in a
company’s profitability will lead on average to a 2.8 per cent increase in
discretionary donations. Thus, our results support Hypothesis 3 and are consistent
with the views of  Ullman (1985), McGuire et al (1988) and Roberts (1992).
Hypothesis 4:   The estimate of the coefficient of lnOWN (b4) was not significantly
different from zero at the 0.05 level. This finding does not, therefore, support the
view that there is a negative relationship between a company’s ownership structure
and level of discretionary donations. Thus, the results do not support Hypothesis 4.
Sensitivity Tests
Next, we extended the regression analysis undertaken above to include two
sensitivity tests. First, we tested for industry effects. Roberts (1992, p. 605) reports
that “. . . industry classifications used in prior research . . . have captured some
systematic relation between broad industry characteristics, such as intensity of
competition, consumer visibility or regulatory risk, and social responsibility
activities”. Cowen et al (1987, p. 113) share a similar view in stating that “. . . some
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industries . . . feel greater government pressures in certain areas of corporate social
responsibility and are, therefore, more likely to enhance their image through social
reponsibility [activities]. . .”.  In our test, three dummy variables were included in
the discretionary donations equation for the construction, services/utilities and
other industry groups (with manufacturing/engineering used as a control group).
In the regression, none of the dummy variables had coefficient estimates
significantly different from zero ( the t-values were -0.23, -1.24 and -0.87
respectively). Thus, contrary to the expectations of Roberts (1992) and Cowen et al
(1987), we are able to find no statistically significant industry effects on the
corporate decision to contribute discretionary donations.
Second, we examined whether our results were influenced by the nationality of the
companies included in the sample. Haley (1991, p. 498) argues that “. . . managers
may use contributions to reassure communities. For example, multinational
corporations often use community contributions to legitimize subsidiaries in host
countries”. On this argument, we might expect non-UK owned companies to be
larger contributors of discretionary donations than UK-owned companies. To test
this, a dummy variable, D, was included in the discretionary donations equation (D
= 0 for companies with a non-UK majority ownership, and D = 1 for companies with
a UK majority ownership). In the regression, the estimate of the coefficient of D was
positive (contrary to our expectations), but was not significantly different from zero
at the five per cent level (t = 0.26). Thus, we are able to conclude that our results are
not sensitive to the nationality of the companies in the sample.
CONCLUSION
This study tests empirically the determinants of the discretionary donations made
by UK companies. Drawing a framework from stakeholder theory, four hypotheses
are tested using 1994 cross-sectional data drawn from the full population of
companies listed on the LSE. Consistent with our hypotheses, the results suggest
that the level of corporate discretionary donations is positively related to company
size and profitability and negatively related to leverage. Ownership structure is
found to have an insignificant influence, and we also find no evidence of industry
effects or of a link between discretionary donations and the nationality of the
companies in the sample.
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In addition to testing the four hypotheses, the estimated model enables us to
compare the predicted levels of discretionary donations for different companies.
For example, a large, profitable company with low leverage (say, assets of £10
billion, a profit rate of 0.25 and leverage of 0.05) would be predicted to contribute as
much as £1.65 million per annum in discretionary donations. On the other hand, a
small, unprofitable company with high leverage (say, assets of just £10 million, a
profit rate of 0.05 and leverage of 0.5) would be predicted to contribute only £6,500
per annum. These predictions can be compared with the average level of
discretionary donations by the companies in the sample of £950,000 per annum.
A possible limitation of the study is that the data used only covers a single
accounting period and could therefore reflect time-specific effects such as annual
fluctuations in the contributions made to charities and other groups by UK
companies. A longitudinal study into the determinants of corporate discretionary
donations could yield some interesting comparative results. Despite this
shortcoming, we believe that the evidence reported in this study provides insights
into the determinants of corporate contributions to social causes and offers at least a
starting point for the conduct of some fruitful future research.
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NOTES
1. Roberts (1992) considers corporate social responsibility to involve activities
which identify a company as being concerned with societal issues.
2. However, in absolute terms the annual amount donated by UK companies is
only about one-tenth of the figure contributed by US companies.  For
example, Haley (1991) reports that US corporations contribute over $6.5
billion per annum to charities and community projects.
3. Unfortunately, time and lack of  research funds prevented time-series data
from being obtained. Therefore, the possibility that our results may be
influenced by time-specific events (e.g. short-term fluctuations in corporate
donations due to economic recession) is acknowledged to be an inherent
limitation of the study.  In addition, published reports had to be used as the
collection of data on corporate donations from Datastream proved to be
problematic.
4. Section 211 of the UK Companies Act 1985 requires companies to maintain a
register of shareholdings in excess of 3 per cent of the total number of shares
in issue. As a result, UK listed companies routinely disclose details of their
major shareholdings in the directors’ report.
5. The variance inflation factor is computed as 1/(1 - R2), where R2 is derived
from the regression of each independent variable on all the other
explanatory variables.
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